Routledge Handbook of Propositions

Routledge Handbook of Propositions

Murray, Adam; Tillman, Chris

Taylor & Francis Ltd

09/2022

554

Dura

Inglês

9781138282940

15 a 20 dias

1206

Descrição não disponível.
Introduction Part I: Foundational Issues in the Theory of Propositions 1. The Linguistic Basis for Propositions 2. Propositions, Posits, and States of Affairs 3. Instrumentalism about Structured Propositions Part II: Historical Theories of Propositions 4. Ancient Theories of Propositions 5. Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the Later Medieval Debate 6. Lockean Propositions 7. Kant, Propositions, and Non-Fundamental Metaphysics 8. Bolzano's Theory of Satz an sich 9. Frege on Thoughts 10. Russell on Propositions Part III: Contemporary Theories and Further Issues 11. Propositions as (Flexible) Types of Possibilities 12. Truthmaker Accounts of Propositions 13. Syntactically Structured Propositions 14. Propositions as Interpreted Abstracta 15. The View of Propositions as Types of Actions 16. Cognitive Propositions: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Empirical Adequacy 17. Propositions as Cambridge Properties 18. Why 0-Adic Relations Have Truth Conditions: Essence, Ground, and Non-Hylomorphic Russellian Propositions 19. Propositions without Parts 20. Hylomorphic Propositions 21. Temporal Propositions and Our Attitudes toward the Past and the Future 22. Frege's Other Puzzle: Relativity in Propositional Content 23. Propositions and Attitudes De Se 24. Propositional Dependence and Perspectival Shift 25. Attitudinal Objects and Propositions 26. Propositions as Objects of the Attitudes 27. The Varieties of Gappy Propositions 28. Plenitudinous Russellianism 29. Semantic Relationism 30. Propositions and Questions 31. The Propositional Benacerraf Problem 32. Reference, Propositions, and the World 33. Propositional Paradox
Vice Versa;Russellian Propositions;Frege's Puzzle;Singular Propositions;True Iff;Propositional Attitudes;Mental Sentence;Propositional Roles;Gappy Propositions;Structured Propositions;Mental Propositions;Mark Twain;Attitudinal Objects;Propositional Relation;Benacerraf Problem;Propositional Object Dependence;Compositional Semantics;Attitude Verbs;Primary Bearers;Frege Geach Problem;Cambridge Properties;Propositional Constituents;Temporal Proposition;Van Inwagen;Belief Report