Belief as Emotion
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Belief as Emotion
McCormick, Miriam Schleifer
Oxford University Press
12/2024
176
Dura
9780198875826
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Preface
1: Introduction
1.1 Is the view of belief as emotion problematically revisionary?
1.2 The standard view of belief and the rise of non-doxasticism
1.3 Is this a "?
1.4 Chapter summaries
2: Belief as a Blended State
2.1 The belief emotion
2.2 Questions and clarifications
2.3 Different ways of characterizing the belief emotion
2.4 Summary
3: Defending Doxasticism about Delusions
3.1 Motivations for non-doxasticism about delusions
3.2 Countering non-doxasticism
3.3 Delusions as recalcitrant emotions
3.4 Summary
4: Defending Doxasticism about Religious Conviction and Political Ideology
4.1 Non- doxasticism in the religious and political domains
4.2 Critique of religious and political non-doxasticism
4.3 Addressing the normative question
4.4 Summary
5: Trusting is Believing
5.1 Arguments that Trusting is not believing
5.2 Arguments that there are no good non-evidential reasons for trust
5.3 There can be good non-evidential reasons for emotions, including belief
5.4 Other approaches
5.5 Summary
6: Implicit attitudes and Self-Deception: Examples of Emotional Conflict
6.1 Self-Deception
6.2 Implicit attitudes
6.3 The
1: Introduction
1.1 Is the view of belief as emotion problematically revisionary?
1.2 The standard view of belief and the rise of non-doxasticism
1.3 Is this a "?
1.4 Chapter summaries
2: Belief as a Blended State
2.1 The belief emotion
2.2 Questions and clarifications
2.3 Different ways of characterizing the belief emotion
2.4 Summary
3: Defending Doxasticism about Delusions
3.1 Motivations for non-doxasticism about delusions
3.2 Countering non-doxasticism
3.3 Delusions as recalcitrant emotions
3.4 Summary
4: Defending Doxasticism about Religious Conviction and Political Ideology
4.1 Non- doxasticism in the religious and political domains
4.2 Critique of religious and political non-doxasticism
4.3 Addressing the normative question
4.4 Summary
5: Trusting is Believing
5.1 Arguments that Trusting is not believing
5.2 Arguments that there are no good non-evidential reasons for trust
5.3 There can be good non-evidential reasons for emotions, including belief
5.4 Other approaches
5.5 Summary
6: Implicit attitudes and Self-Deception: Examples of Emotional Conflict
6.1 Self-Deception
6.2 Implicit attitudes
6.3 The
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Preface
1: Introduction
1.1 Is the view of belief as emotion problematically revisionary?
1.2 The standard view of belief and the rise of non-doxasticism
1.3 Is this a "?
1.4 Chapter summaries
2: Belief as a Blended State
2.1 The belief emotion
2.2 Questions and clarifications
2.3 Different ways of characterizing the belief emotion
2.4 Summary
3: Defending Doxasticism about Delusions
3.1 Motivations for non-doxasticism about delusions
3.2 Countering non-doxasticism
3.3 Delusions as recalcitrant emotions
3.4 Summary
4: Defending Doxasticism about Religious Conviction and Political Ideology
4.1 Non- doxasticism in the religious and political domains
4.2 Critique of religious and political non-doxasticism
4.3 Addressing the normative question
4.4 Summary
5: Trusting is Believing
5.1 Arguments that Trusting is not believing
5.2 Arguments that there are no good non-evidential reasons for trust
5.3 There can be good non-evidential reasons for emotions, including belief
5.4 Other approaches
5.5 Summary
6: Implicit attitudes and Self-Deception: Examples of Emotional Conflict
6.1 Self-Deception
6.2 Implicit attitudes
6.3 The
1: Introduction
1.1 Is the view of belief as emotion problematically revisionary?
1.2 The standard view of belief and the rise of non-doxasticism
1.3 Is this a "?
1.4 Chapter summaries
2: Belief as a Blended State
2.1 The belief emotion
2.2 Questions and clarifications
2.3 Different ways of characterizing the belief emotion
2.4 Summary
3: Defending Doxasticism about Delusions
3.1 Motivations for non-doxasticism about delusions
3.2 Countering non-doxasticism
3.3 Delusions as recalcitrant emotions
3.4 Summary
4: Defending Doxasticism about Religious Conviction and Political Ideology
4.1 Non- doxasticism in the religious and political domains
4.2 Critique of religious and political non-doxasticism
4.3 Addressing the normative question
4.4 Summary
5: Trusting is Believing
5.1 Arguments that Trusting is not believing
5.2 Arguments that there are no good non-evidential reasons for trust
5.3 There can be good non-evidential reasons for emotions, including belief
5.4 Other approaches
5.5 Summary
6: Implicit attitudes and Self-Deception: Examples of Emotional Conflict
6.1 Self-Deception
6.2 Implicit attitudes
6.3 The
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
