Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics
portes grátis
Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics
An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance
Weir, Ralph Stefan
Taylor & Francis Ltd
11/2024
178
Mole
9781032457697
Pré-lançamento - envio 15 a 20 dias após a sua edição
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Introduction 1. Why Does Everyone Hate the Soul? 2. The Decline of Substance Dualism and the Substance-Property Distinction 3. A Defence of the Independence Definition of Substance 4. Four Theories of Mind and the Place of Russellian Monism 5. The Strangeness of Property Dualism 6. Parity of Reasoning Demands Nonphysical Substances 7. The Consequences of the Parity Argument for Non-Physical Substances Conclusion
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Ralph Stefan Weir;philosophy of mind;metaphysics;mind-body problem;materialism;substance dualism;idealism;Descartes;physicalism;property dualism;Russelian monism;Wolff's trichotomy;substances;nonphysical substances;parity argument;Mind Body Problem;Russellian Monism;Phenomenal Concepts;Conceivability Argument;Nonphysical Properties;Phenomenal Facts;Physical Things;Phenomenal Properties;Ghost World;Concrete Properties;Concrete Universals;Soul Body Dualism;Present Day Philosophy;Nonphysical Things;Phenomenal Consciousness;Metaphysical Reading;Causal Reading;Nonreductive Physicalism;Transcendental Egos;Token Identity Theory;Kripke's Argument
Introduction 1. Why Does Everyone Hate the Soul? 2. The Decline of Substance Dualism and the Substance-Property Distinction 3. A Defence of the Independence Definition of Substance 4. Four Theories of Mind and the Place of Russellian Monism 5. The Strangeness of Property Dualism 6. Parity of Reasoning Demands Nonphysical Substances 7. The Consequences of the Parity Argument for Non-Physical Substances Conclusion
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Ralph Stefan Weir;philosophy of mind;metaphysics;mind-body problem;materialism;substance dualism;idealism;Descartes;physicalism;property dualism;Russelian monism;Wolff's trichotomy;substances;nonphysical substances;parity argument;Mind Body Problem;Russellian Monism;Phenomenal Concepts;Conceivability Argument;Nonphysical Properties;Phenomenal Facts;Physical Things;Phenomenal Properties;Ghost World;Concrete Properties;Concrete Universals;Soul Body Dualism;Present Day Philosophy;Nonphysical Things;Phenomenal Consciousness;Metaphysical Reading;Causal Reading;Nonreductive Physicalism;Transcendental Egos;Token Identity Theory;Kripke's Argument
