Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation

Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Formal Causation

Jansen, Ludger; Sandstad, Petter

Taylor & Francis Ltd

03/2021

316

Dura

Inglês

9780367341206

15 a 20 dias

743

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Introducing Formal Causation
Ludger Jansen and Petter Sandstad

Part I: Scholastic Approaches to Formal Causation




Form, Intention, Information: From Scholastic Logic to Artificial Intelligence
Gyula Klima




Formal Causation: Accidental and Substantial
David S. Oderberg

Part II: Contemporary Approaches to Formal Causation




A Non-hylomorphic Account of Formal Causation
Petter Sandstad and Ludger Jansen




Formal Causes for Powers Theorists
Giacomo Giannini and Stephen Mumford




Away with Dispositional Essences in Trope Theory
Jani Hakkarainen and Markku Keinaenen




Functional Powers
Michele Paolini Paoletti

Part III: Formal Causation and Dependence




An Aristotelian Approach to Existential Dependence
Benjamin Schnieder and Jonas Werner




Finean Feature Dependence and the Aristotelian Alternative
Wolfgang Sattler




A Problem for Natural-Kind Essentialism and Formal Causes
Jose Tomas Alvarado and Matthew Tugby

Part IV: Formal Causation in Biology and Cognitive Sciences




Form as Cause and the Formal Cause: Aristotle's Answer
James G. Lennox




Form, Cause, and Explanation in Biology: A Neo-Aristotelian Perspective
Christopher J. Austin




Formal Explanation and Mechanisms of Conceptual Representation

Sandeep Prasada
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Vice Versa;Formal causation;Dispositional Essentialism;Aristotelian formal causation;Contemporary philosophy;Fine's Essentialism;Contemporary metaphysics;Trope Theorist;Cognitive sciences;Violated;Real Definitions;Unit Negative Charge;Natural Kind Essentialism;Mereological Sum;Formal Explanations;Bundle Theories;Functional Powers;Counterfactual Dependence;Ontological Dependence;Essentialist Dependence;Natural Kinds;Hylomorphic Theories;Substantial Forms;Ontological Priority;Essential Kind;Metaphysical Explanations;Rest Mass;GRNs.;Teleological Powers