Levels of Explanation
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Levels of Explanation
Wilson, Alastair; Robertson, Katie
Oxford University Press
12/2024
432
Dura
9780192862945
Pré-lançamento - envio 15 a 20 dias após a sua edição
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Katie Robertson and Alastair Wilson: Introduction: Levels of Explanation
Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework
2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the Challenge of Mixed Models
6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in Cognitive Neuroscience
9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of Physics
12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set Theory
14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of Deterministic Chance
Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws
Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework
2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the Challenge of Mixed Models
6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in Cognitive Neuroscience
9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of Physics
12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set Theory
14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of Deterministic Chance
Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Katie Robertson and Alastair Wilson: Introduction: Levels of Explanation
Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework
2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the Challenge of Mixed Models
6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in Cognitive Neuroscience
9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of Physics
12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set Theory
14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of Deterministic Chance
Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws
Part I: Foundations of Explanatory Levels
1: Christian List: Levels of Description and Levels of Reality: A General Framework
2: Angela Potochnik: Antireductionism Has Outgrown Levels
3: Alexander Franklin: How the Reductionist Should Respond to the Multiscale Argument, and What This Tells Us About Levels
Part II: Levels of Explanation in Causal Modelling
4: Brad Weslake: Exclusion Excluded
5: Vera Hoffmann-Kolss: Interventionist Causal Exclusion and the Challenge of Mixed Models
6: David Yates: From Multilevel Explanation to Downward Causation
Part III: Levels of Explanation in Higher-Level Sciences
7: William Bechtel: Explanatory Levels in Living Organisms
8: Mazviita Chirimuuta: From Analogies to Levels of Abstraction in Cognitive Neuroscience
9: Harold Kincaid: Messy but Real Levels in the Social Sciences
Part IV: Levels of Explanation in Physics
10: Eleanor Knox: Levels Worth Having: A View from Physics
11: Karen Crowther: Levels of Fundamentality in the Metaphysics of Physics
12: Kerry McKenzie: No Grounds for Effective Theories
Part V: Levels of Explanation in Mathematics and Metaphysics
13: Carolin Antos and Mark Colyvan: Explanation in Descriptive Set Theory
14: Elanor Taylor: A Dormitive Virtue Puzzle
15: Nina Emery: The Explanatory Role Argument and the Metaphysics of Deterministic Chance
Part VI: How are Explanatory Levels Possible?
16: Harjit Bhogal: Why Are There High-Level Regularities?
17: Michael Strevens: Why High-Level Explanations Exist
18: Michael Townsen Hicks: A Democracy of Laws
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.